En

Xen官网安全更新(2021-09-01)

来源:Xen官网 发布日期:2021-09-01 阅读次数:143 评论:0

基本信息

发布日期:2021-09-01(官方当地时间)

更新类型:安全更新

更新版本:未知

感知时间:2021-09-08 20:36:57

风险等级:未知

情报贡献:TSRC

更新标题

IOMMU page mapping issues on x86

更新详情




XSA-378 - Xen Security Advisories



InformationAdvisory XSA-378Public release 2021-08-25 12:00Updated 2021-09-01 09:30Version 3CVE(s) CVE-2021-28694 CVE-2021-28695 CVE-2021-28696Title IOMMU page mapping issues on x86Filesadvisory-378.txt (signed advisory file)xsa378.metaxsa378/xsa378-1.patchxsa378/xsa378-2.patchxsa378/xsa378-3.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-0a.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-0b.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-0c.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-1.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-2.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-3.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-4.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-5.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-6.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-7.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.11-8.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-0a.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-0b.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-0c.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-1.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-2.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-3.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-4.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-5.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-6.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-7.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.12-8.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-0a.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-0b.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-0c.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-1.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-2.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-3.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-4.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-5.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-6.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-7.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.13-8.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.14-1.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.14-2.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.14-3.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.14-4.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.14-5.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.14-6.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.14-7.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.14-8.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.15-1.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.15-2.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.15-3.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.15-4.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.15-5.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.15-6.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.15-7.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.15-8.patchxsa378/xsa378-4.patchxsa378/xsa378-5.patchxsa378/xsa378-6.patchxsa378/xsa378-7.patchxsa378/xsa378-8.patchAdvisory-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Xen Security Advisory CVE-2021-28694,CVE-2021-28695,CVE-2021-28696 / XSA-378
version 3

IOMMU page mapping issues on x86

UPDATES IN VERSION 3
====================

Warn about dom0=pvh breakage in Resolution section.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

Both AMD and Intel allow ACPI tables to specify regions of memory
which should be left untranslated, which typically means these
addresses should pass the translation phase unaltered. While these
are typically device specific ACPI properties, they can also be
specified to apply to a range of devices, or even all devices.

On all systems with such regions Xen failed to prevent guests from
undoing/replacing such mappings (CVE-2021-28694).

On AMD systems, where a discontinuous range is specified by firmware,
the supposedly-excluded middle range will also be identity-mapped
(CVE-2021-28695).

Further, on AMD systems, upon de-assigment of a physical device from a
guest, the identity mappings would be left in place, allowing a guest
continued access to ranges of memory which it shouldn't have access to
anymore (CVE-2021-28696).

IMPACT
======

The precise impact is system specific, but can - on affected systems -
be any or all of privilege escalation, denial of service, or information
leaks.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

The vulnerability is only exploitable by guests granted access to
physical devices (ie, via PCI passthrough).

All versions of Xen are affected.

Only x86 systems with IOMMUs and with firmware specifying memory regions
to be identity mapped are affected. Other x86 systems are not affected.

Whether a particular system whose ACPI tables declare such memory
region(s) is actually affected cannot be known without knowing when
and/or how these regions are used. For example, if these regions were
used only during system boot, there would not be any vulnerability.
The necessary knowledge can only be obtained from, collectively, the
hardware and firmware manufacturers.

On Arm hardware IOMMU use is not security supported. Accordingly, we
have not undertaken an analysis of these issues for Arm systems.

MITIGATION
==========

Not permitting untrusted guests access to phsyical devices will avoid
the vulnerability.

Likewise, limiting untrusted guest access to physical devices whose
firmware-provided ACPI tables declare identity mappings, will avoid
the vulnerability. (Provided that there are no identity mapped
regions which are specified by the ACPI tables to apply globally.)

Note that a system is still vulnerable if a guest was trusted, while
it had such a device assigned, and then has the device removed in
anticipation of the guest becoming untrusted (because of, for example,
the insertion of an untrusted kernel module),

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich of SUSE.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the appropriate set of attached patches resolves this issue.

However, these patches are known to badly break PVH dom0 support.
Work is ongoing to resolve the problem, and will be committed to the
appropriate Xen trees (including backports) when ready. PVH dom0 has
"Technical Preview" status so we do not intend to distribute the fixes
via an update to this advisory

Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to
apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most
recent release tarball. Downstreams are encouraged to update to the
tip of the stable branch before applying these patches.

xsa378/xsa378-?.patch xen-unstable
xsa378/xsa378-4.15-?.patch Xen 4.15.x
xsa378/xsa378-4.14-?.patch Xen 4.14.x
xsa378/xsa378-4.13-*.patch Xen 4.13.x
xsa378/xsa378-4.12-*.patch Xen 4.12.x
xsa378/xsa378-4.11-*.patch Xen 4.11.x

$ sha256sum xsa378* xsa378*/*
b3b49681468bd2be4b95fc1d3861493bbea63bac1c115a12ece76d0313b6a81c xsa378.meta
2560d4418e6b6d022b4e7fe1f84906ca13b3180537e746ee81cd3f97f0e86c35 xsa378/xsa378-1.patch
134b207c38f8d76bbc218220f1e61f82780e8166818ef51217716023cc27ce3c xsa378/xsa378-2.patch
c166ef60e08a80440f79d92abe8488b123c8017e7633dbddacb95b20899f9b2b xsa378/xsa378-3.patch
a2677e157724f57f65165f361a309c417d123ff009168f16d3a0e342b7a601eb xsa378/xsa378-4.11-0a.patch
832f52f420bb47784bdefd75edd1ca521658327aafb94b4f3586da522d0d19c1 xsa378/xsa378-4.11-0b.patch
9eb7c53892f01424eec6b788f879b36dd75a6f89b1c8b9c973237603525d6546 xsa378/xsa378-4.11-0c.patch
48021fb9a2c52d7939fd11bbba80c67a5a5b6cae2039b4b2a2c6203eb5841260 xsa378/xsa378-4.11-1.patch
4f3fd39aa328c1e397aa2a10b92e98cc341908a8834302a4fc0f230876dd3570 xsa378/xsa378-4.11-2.patch
6e2eeecd2ccc4029f80888263f44b80acf078d69aeffda4d6accd8b2d0899182 xsa378/xsa378-4.11-3.patch
194b27510c8765f1cf8abee57624a075ab26f4f889aa8c201e126643f570f55a xsa378/xsa378-4.11-4.patch
e8f4eab0984a7db2ca0c6c9ac0fb9107e45ddd572a36454db4a1bdb8b9a8b0c6 xsa378/xsa378-4.11-5.patch
943c7556be47b1a0f2273cf5691fe70dc65e6cb50ff0477d1d61eb3f0ba87a97 xsa378/xsa378-4.11-6.patch
2eb572e1a55caa4aca31f74a3844135a204c4e023a6776d7adc4f4043663fb99 xsa378/xsa378-4.11-7.patch
7c24ba33461d3adcb195a6611df3e9c0501e9dcacf9b8811456450b291d23edf xsa378/xsa378-4.11-8.patch
fe14ea6699df673b787f93ff821838f2280407674df0c8c06d40efe8320e8748 xsa378/xsa378-4.12-0a.patch
1ba10aef9ea99c4455a34e61792ca65ea6b2ece56f05cd0b4adc14600a7ae346 xsa378/xsa378-4.12-0b.patch
2c2dbc0c18b695c1d2c93e4137228f82b6d21d895c3165a9e29ddea3db78e36a xsa378/xsa378-4.12-0c.patch
48021fb9a2c52d7939fd11bbba80c67a5a5b6cae2039b4b2a2c6203eb5841260 xsa378/xsa378-4.12-1.patch
f0d62506ccdf081d0efbb553e2d33f17a084272d21f43bf95d11fda2dcc8a3fa xsa378/xsa378-4.12-2.patch
e266512b18fc30e5bd4884cd720aa81644d3ca3323b38fe1f77d06fa98dd515d xsa378/xsa378-4.12-3.patch
076f9955593a8ebdea5f24ed302b8a1004bbf50da4c8becf1f93764066b8981c xsa378/xsa378-4.12-4.patch
9639bc35636ffae4e2b6dd026387347960c1fb986cb2924a18314a72e6b6ec0a xsa378/xsa378-4.12-5.patch
32dd659aa365d9f8197d99b9334c22b33e9ce805e30376457df6e507f92282c8 xsa378/xsa378-4.12-6.patch
7eaae2fa968eb11e27277141456cc1bd657025aee738221c368e153535c7c0f4 xsa378/xsa378-4.12-7.patch
05982f43f35b580ff41f74b1280e469e0dd20176f184ec04a4874303c2aa3ad1 xsa378/xsa378-4.12-8.patch
c6f551ef9903a343b47692b34a63c70165a2dbf74878a6be6511cdffd55a7e8c xsa378/xsa378-4.13-0a.patch
223cd63f7e1c39d862b8654da698455ded65ecb5abae0f57c330921522b7fdb4 xsa378/xsa378-4.13-0b.patch
5c33aa24f14e779dfe914e809cff11260083169a3adfb07a31ce11243d80b3ef xsa378/xsa378-4.13-0c.patch
1d55426ff6a41f0ef4cbd2c943edafff394157703bb0b6ae751564abf93b5ee7 xsa378/xsa378-4.13-1.patch
4d5e7d5e65cd28d6bc7d1a9f2ab24f09dfaef295c4199d5f2db00915dcaa174f xsa378/xsa378-4.13-2.patch
78df0bcb347f8bb45827f74b191aad36b6e907eb38c6d535035f2b2739645551 xsa378/xsa378-4.13-3.patch
237c33e0ae01a23db01721afb8e6a39101bfe081f8b75dbcff6b9fa9c9aaceda xsa378/xsa378-4.13-4.patch
7d2f3ae3881d28073be54a6dfb35f13004e4efee742952788430201d86307ecf xsa378/xsa378-4.13-5.patch
2ecd7580394667db0c41e4819025393e59ae24d6c97d54451c8e683585057367 xsa378/xsa378-4.13-6.patch
592a03d00e5d22d7a3c001681968dc469c70b3e57998b95877388e9528904ea2 xsa378/xsa378-4.13-7.patch
54e6a095f706c66dbbd74e39aa1d88031c9b537589e73ceb2925e2f0cc1854f0 xsa378/xsa378-4.13-8.patch
1d55426ff6a41f0ef4cbd2c943edafff394157703bb0b6ae751564abf93b5ee7 xsa378/xsa378-4.14-1.patch
86fbd88eb8a358575e42cf335c444b047ddb4d2f1c6a1bc6f9e57e6ac0041074 xsa378/xsa378-4.14-2.patch
0a23e5f93ff1bb55f003a56e0ef8c531384b164f0e840f5794acdb9ae3e91996 xsa378/xsa378-4.14-3.patch
e2226f7ddae1d24dbee8cf19efa8d67ebf312f3d10641cb9aec21d68a3c8f818 xsa378/xsa378-4.14-4.patch
f2cf8f7e4aa0460e606b5564adde366332ed323c4d5e3f957e64299ef1bc9baf xsa378/xsa378-4.14-5.patch
7811426975757e3bb8c6ab3161ba2354e1780b55b9e6be7928229d5f23bf79b6 xsa378/xsa378-4.14-6.patch
58147bd6c0ea4e08e84a17afc796be4bbe53e6fbc1d393f9fe3c6191fd33eba5 xsa378/xsa378-4.14-7.patch
682a011d807a7c284faf0ec9d2cf0aabaddbc658979dea2b9ccbc007b660f9c5 xsa378/xsa378-4.14-8.patch
a00ada0cd673f0909cc7b462cb532dbd6fe17601e06bd84272f5ff1857ea4c73 xsa378/xsa378-4.15-1.patch
d74cc325be1e47d61ba3b1400837af35d044bf1d25806aa98926ec262f80bddd xsa378/xsa378-4.15-2.patch
2ad685a04dbbdd2c81761b58146e70059b8a8a92b0c1176f36933510293ece5b xsa378/xsa378-4.15-3.patch
18de9facccd70ce49dd839e219fe71667c43110e474e5d7b56a503a5786fc7e0 xsa378/xsa378-4.15-4.patch
296558b27ba82176f6d06b721102c8ba7c7e6e99d29b29392ea82244e88df0b9 xsa378/xsa378-4.15-5.patch
5d7cc84c66daf0aceab9407fa72f2827024c847f4ca10f8d123eee87b7451aba xsa378/xsa378-4.15-6.patch
fd4aa4447562230a6684d17e6e4c55f1e48df4773247f66ab9d01181003bc9aa xsa378/xsa378-4.15-7.patch
5305e3bc513bcd3e016ca3bbecc6cae38c8ed2b2eacb13e82f7b1f4401d3b67d xsa378/xsa378-4.15-8.patch
78390bf59344ea5dcbfa5831db3634b3f1b3aabf029160c72cdbeeec2b46b2a9 xsa378/xsa378-4.patch
76fb4a1f2604b98d3a803744ad212b3984117ec8c8011ad6db3759f9337a9b5a xsa378/xsa378-5.patch
a627f8c6b7d2ffac0b6de945189f96b718aeab8e0c8bb11476a40585d6411bd7 xsa378/xsa378-6.patch
28814b51fabd3c5cb3ca249ad291781f589cddd55fc8152fdd5668c5fcdc727c xsa378/xsa378-7.patch
30e31749ade75fd5ab4c41fa27fe2124bdcc602ccc803a85e5eeec1b9c48a9c1 xsa378/xsa378-8.patch
$

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.


(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQFABAEBCAAqFiEEI+MiLBRfRHX6gGCng/4UyVfoK9kFAmEvSCUMHHBncEB4ZW4u
b3JnAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZrUYH/iYMkjMzUpv5ik/quZ+z34uXwq/mD8x8ROZKXDev
tgojXcFo0vNlcr71R0J5KrE0YeX+3MjbjqbF7A30cnw4/bgmvhzcdP/fwOfIKFYE
JqaGoDaxFRpsIMvHFXV6OxtjgBgleUukaikUrcwWUG+L90KMmjqZU4IAlNcBAALC
J6rDB8nHqD1s+ODIPdPE149jIE7LJfVqyuu9h4r/jmLEDRJBS2YEs6zgClqnIApl
3WBpZNhp8Tk3BFtbQcu4Uh9c0itymtp+8VsY0xzF2bWsE4aoe5DKHv0DyTSLe9Md
pMG0egH7ZrI3MV4nzHdbhkA2Hn3X0rsJiI7TXpmmQPmgi4g=
=A/oT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Xenproject.org Security Team

软件描述

Xen 是一个开放源代码虚拟机监视器,由剑桥大学开发。它打算在单个计算机上运行多达100个满特征的操作系统。操作系统必须进行显式地修改(“移植”)以在Xen上运行(但是提供对用户应用的兼容性)。这使得Xen无需特殊硬件支持,就能达到高性能的虚拟化。

TSRC分析

暂无

业界资讯

暂无

评论

提交评论 您输入的评论有误,请重新输入